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FLIGHT SAFETY STRATEGY
Introduction
1. A Flight Safety organisation has been functioning in the IAF since 1960. Procedures of flight safety management at various levels have been outlined in the Manual of Flight Safety Management (IAP 3030).
2. The mission of the Flight Safety organisation of the IAF is to ensure operational capability by conserving human and material resources through prevention of aircraft accidents.
3. As risk is inherent in military aviation, it has to be assessed and managed effectively. In order to accomplish the mission safely, a well-defined strategy is given in the subsequent paragraphs.
Mission Statement
“The mission of the Flight Safety organisation of the IAF is to ensure operational capability by conserving human and material resources through prevention of aircraft accidents.”
Pillars of Flight Safety
4. Under the provisions of the concepts of Flight Safety, a set of "recommended Pillars" to enhance safety has been identified. These recommended pillars serve as the criteria for qualification of safety status of the operational IAF units. The criteria that serve as the cornerstones of the Flight Safety Concept are outlined below: -
(a) Technology. It implies the optimal utilisation of available technology that affects flight operations. This would include identification of vulnerable technologies, their management, identification of design deficiencies and difficult maintenance practices.
(b) Capability. It involves the building up of capacity in the Air Force of man and machine for safe and successful mission accomplishment. This would encompass drawing on the ability and competence of all personnel involved in aviation.
(c) Training. Effective training is necessary to impart and progressively build required skills, knowledge and professional competence, which match the requirements of the first two pillars given above. With such training in place, there would be better ‘risk management’ leading to an improved fight safety.
(d) Environment. A safe environment would optimally utilise all elements of a program that not only supports flight operations but also human resource and build the morale of the personnel. This covers a whole range of infrastructure, which must mandatorily be in place and effective. This is important, since deficiencies in infrastructure would nullify the positive aspects of the first three pillars.
Safety Culture
5. Every organisation holds common beliefs, values and ethos that constitute its “culture”. These characteristics have often become invisible to those inside, but may be startling to outsiders coming from a different culture. The notion of an organisational culture is difficult to define. It simply is ‘Who and what we are, what we find important, and how we go about doing things’.
6. Though Flight Safety has always been a concern in the IAF, we need to assess the extent to which our safety culture has evolved. Safety cultures may fall under one of the following categories: -
(a) Pathological. Where we care less about safety than about not being caught.
(b) Reactive. Reactive is when we look for fixes to accidents and incidents after they happen.
(c) Calculative. We do have systems in place to manage hazards, however the system is applied mechanically. Field units and HQs follow the procedures but do not necessarily believe those procedures are critically important to their jobs or operations.
(d) Proactive. Proactive is when there are systems in place to manage potential hazards and rectify these before an accident. Units and higher formations have begun to acquire beliefs that Flight Safety is genuinely worthwhile and look ahead in a proactive manner.
(e) Generative. What we really require to strive for is to inculcate Safety behaviour fully and integrate it into everything we do. The value system associated with safety and safe working is fully internalised as beliefs, almost to the point of invisibility.
7. To reach the apex of performance pyramid, the IAF would have to be Generative in nature. To achieve this on a sustainable basis we have to clearly define and delineate various facets of the organisational work and define our tasks and endeavours in these areas. Hence it is necessary to lay down our concepts and the method of achieving this clearly.
Technology
8. Aviation in general and military aviation in particular is driven by technology. Technologies are getting outdated faster than the full utilisation of aircraft. Therefore, we are saddled with ac and technology that is more than four decades old. In the past two decades, technology has leaped from single engine transonic jets with minimal instrumentation to supersonic ac with an array of avionics.
9. Technological Asymmetry. The challenge with the IAF today is that it needs to keep pace with the proliferation of new glass cockpits, and yet be able to manage and maintain the vintage technologies. We operate a large variety of aircraft comprising both Russian and Western fleet with varied technology vintages ranging from low-tech to the modern. While modern state-of-the-art technology aircraft contribute towards safer and efficient operations, it is the older technology that needs our best effort to improve its reliability.
10. Identification of Deficiencies in Design / Equipment. It would be prudent to clearly identify deficiencies in design or equipment, which are not conducive to safe operations. This would involve examination of obsolete equipment, difficult maintenance practices and equipment prone to frequent failures. Thereafter, either we shelve such equipment no matter what the cost, or, train and improve capability of the human element to anticipate and act effectively in a crisis. Decision in this regard needs careful consideration of not only the financial implication but also of op degradation aspects. Hence, the following strategies need to be adopted to ensure safe operations: -
(a) Identifying the vulnerable technology and replacing old technology ac with new in a phased manner.
(b) Retaining the best personnel in the older technologies.
11. Diversified Inventory. The next concern is the disadvantage of a wide spectrum of ac on our inventory. The problem areas in this regard are maintenance, training, inter-operability and interchangeability. Further, spares management is difficult and expensive as it is not financially prudent to hold large inventories of spares and consumables. Limited availability of spares especially from the erstwhile Soviet state, compounded by long gestation period has adversely affected maintenance at the field. In order to meet the training and operational requirements, field units resort to cannibalisation, leading further to unserviceabilities, thus ensnaring the organisation into a vicious circle. These ultimately result in a large number of concessions given to ac, excessive downtime, non-availability of redundancy and therefore work pressure. Therefore, the following need to be adopted: -
(a) Future acquisition plans need to be based on symmetry of technology in our training and operational aircraft without unwarranted diversification.
(b) The acquisition of capital equipment should factor in past performance and adequate contractual obligation on the vendors to ensure reliability and maintainability of the equipment.
12. Maintenance of Older Technologies. The useful life of an aircraft is said to be over when the economics of maintenance exceed the value of the aeroplane. Nevertheless, we do not fly based on economics alone and continue to maintain an aircraft well beyond fiscal feasibility. With aircraft ageing, general wear and tear sets in, stress cracks develop, seals fail and corrosion begins. The list is endless and frequently is as much a symptom of old age and possibly inadequate maintenance, as of poor design. Older the equipment more is the maintenance required, necessitating increased man-hours and experienced crew. Occasionally, we attempt to take more out of a machine than is safe without the requisite maintenance investment in terms of manpower and spares. Experienced and the motivated personnel are generally posted to the units with new induction and the older equipment then takes a back seat. This is a sure recipe for accidents and needs to be corrected.
13. The approach that is required is as follows: -
(a) Early identification of ageing symptoms.
(b) Initiation of timely preventive / corrective maintenance.
(c) Every snag / defect needs to be given due importance and followed-up as it is a potential source of latent error. Snag reporting must be encouraged without fear of adverse career impact.
(d) Placement of experienced and motivated personnel with the vulnerable equipment.
14. Challenges of Life Extension. Mechanical devices can and do fail. Some are predictable and preventable to a degree of assurance depending on the preventive measures taken. With ageing of an aircraft or equipment, the probability of failure increases. This failure probability in our ageing fleet stems from limitations of design, degree of manufacturing precision and preventive maintenance initiated especially in respect of aeroengines and critical accessories. Though aeroengines have a defined life, several variables can affect their longevity. Aeroengines are also most prone to failure because of inherent complexity and stresses. In every safety review, the aeroengine is at least twice as likely to be the cause factor in an accident than other aircraft-related causes. Therefore, life extensions need to be undertaken judiciously and backed with extensive study in consultation with the manufacturers.
15. The most significant requirement however is to identify the critical weaknesses in technology, which have a direct bearing on Flight Safety. Having identified these, we then need to manage them by enhanced maintenance, modifications, replacements or even shelving them.
Capability
16. Capability refers to the capacity built up into the organisation to facilitate performance of the task safely and to anticipate and act in face of unforeseen contingencies. It is required to ensure that man machine combination is capable of mission accomplishment with efficiency.
17. Capability vs Task. The organisation should aim to build on its inherent capability to place the right person for the right job. This would need the following: -
(a) Development of job-oriented selection process and training.
(b) Rationalised training for concerned personnel to ensure right training at right stage.
(c) Judicious placement and posting of trained personnel.
18. Professional Competence of Technicians. There is a need to instill a proactive approach and generate dynamic involvement of technicians in matters of aviation safety. The following actions are required to generate a flight safety consciousness right down to the grassroots level: -
(a) Capacity amongst technicians to analyse a snag and take corrective action needs to be nurtured and developed right from the ab-initio stage. Knowledge of the concept behind repair scheme or system maintenance will enable quicker diagnosis of the cause of the problem rather than reacting to the symptoms.
(b) The technicians at the field level should get extensive interaction with the OEMs/ major repair units. This will increase their understanding of the systems besides developing a friendly and informal link between the manufacturers / repair agency and the operators.
(c) The personnel at the field units need an exposure to investigation into incidents / accidents. This would widen the knowledge base and provide first hand account of the factors that led to the incident/accident.
19. Comprehension of Orders and Instructions. During the last decade, human error alone accounted for 45% of the total accidents of the IAF. It is therefore imperative that the person on the ground or in air is competent, qualified and suitable to accomplish the mission safely. Thorough understanding of the SOPs relating to the aircraft, technical practices and the operational environment is a prerequisite. Orders, instructions and policies etc are at best only guidelines for safe operations. Understanding of the rationale behind such SOPs and instructions would facilitate correct judgement / decision-making in complex situations.
20. Trend Analysis. Accident/incident trends require study both at the field units and at HQ. Patterns need to be comprehended to react proactively. The following actions are warranted to derive the maximum benefit from statistics and trends:
(a) History of component-wise / system-wise snags and rectification should be organised and meaningful analysis is to be disseminated to the lowest level.
(b) Periodic feedback and compendiums of accident / incident trends need to be compiled at Command and Air HQ levels to identify critical areas affecting safe operations.
21. Specialist Flight Safety Organisation. The Command structure should reflect the priority of flight safety in the organisation. As far as possible the flight safety set-up should be independent of the executive function to impart objectivity to the assessment of flight safety activities. The concept of a separate flight safety organisation as a career option for volunteers needs to be explored. This is already in vogue in some advanced nations. The actions required in this regard are as follows:-
(a) Personnel who have undergone Flt Sfty courses abroad need to be posted to the Flt Sfty organisation to form its core group.
(b) Training of additional personnel on specialised spheres of accident prevention and investigation is required. Training could be arranged on forensic aspects at DMRL, NAL, NFL, OEM and other organisations to enable in-house expertise in area of accident investigation and attendant area of accident prevention and safety.
(c) Interaction of this organisation with other aviation related organisations like DGCA, AAI etc. on a regular basis is required to be enhanced.
Training
22. New designs aim to reduce workload and simplify systems. But accidents involving basic handling skills and judgement-related mishaps have affected the new models just as they have always plagued the older aircraft. Traditional aviation risk management identifies three sources of risk: the man, the aircraft and the environment. Over the years, most of the flight safety problems related to aircraft and environment have been tackled satisfactorily. Today, a significant amount of the trouble stems from humans. Towards reducing or controlling ‘human error’, training would make a huge difference.
23. Equipment vs Personal Capability. The operational environment is the same for all aircraft, but some ac are better equipped than others. Auto-pilot, on-board radar, and data link multifunction displays do change the environment and do provide the trained pilot with more tools upon which to base good decisions. This decision-making should be the target of our training pattern. Some aspects that require consideration are: -
(a) Better safety because of redundancies lead to increased comfort levels and at times to over-confidence.
(b) These ac are likely to be tasked for tougher / riskier missions and in marginal weather conditions.
(c) The basic aerodynamics of low-speed handling has not been altered appreciably — stalls, directional control, crosswinds and landing flares.
24. Effective training is therefore the foundation of a professional. If any deficiency in the equipment or personal capability exists, it must be improved by appropriate training. Needless to mention, training must be focused and appropriate for ensuring safety.
25. Discipline and Just Culture. Discipline on ground generally translates to flying discipline also. Therefore, there is a need to inculcate discipline as a way of life. Strict action needs to be initiated for any disciplinary lapses in the air. However, the disciplinary action taken must be ‘event-oriented’ and not ‘result-oriented’. Based on intent, knowledge and recklessness, there is a need to distinguish between inadvertent errors, unintentional risk taking and deliberate violations. Only deliberate violations warrant a disciplinary action. Inadvertent errors and unintentional risk taking provide opportunities for system correction and increasing situational awareness. Experience gained out of these ‘learning outcomes’ need to be shared during continuity training for the benefit of the organisation. This would in turn lead to removal of error provoking conditions and creation of error tolerant systems.
26. Maturity and Professionalism. The training establishments have little trouble teaching the aircraft, but developing requisite maturity and professionalism poses some difficulty. A study of HE (A) accidents reveals that this aspect needs greater attention. Following measures are called for: -
(a) The maturity level of officers should be a prime consideration for selection to instructional courses. Most pupil officers try to emulate their instructors and any bravado/false ego inculcated during training manifest later as part of flying discipline.
(b) The maturity level of all supervisors, instructors and trainees in training establishments needs to be monitored on a regular basis.
27. Simulators. The infrastructure available for training has a bearing on the quality of training and the competence of the end product i.e. the trainee. Formal training in the IAF has prepared aircrew dictated by mission requirements. Simulators were not used extensively since they were prohibitively expensive and availability of reliable simulators in the Russian fleet was limited. The first generation simulators had basic flight and instrument skills wired. Pilots were taught aircraft systems but did little else. This induced most to doubt the utility of simulators. The advent of the modern simulators viz. mission simulators, maintenance simulators has changed this mindset. Extensive use of simulators for training of aircrew and technical personnel is prudent and needs to be encouraged.
28. Challenge of Technology Evolution. Difficulty in decision-making arises from the hesitance / confusion caused by complexity of avionics packages that are integral to the control and navigation of the aircraft. Since avionics mutate much faster, the avionics that was top of the line five years ago is now obsolete, and this creates legacy and primacy of training issues (what is learned first is learned best). The best example is the auto pilot system for the Jaguar ac. Most senior pilots at that time felt it would affect pilot trg and build complacency in the pilots. Therefore, training pattern needs to keep pace with the rate of obsolescence.
29. Rationalisation of Syllabi. This brings us to the adequacy of training pattern, syllabus and SOPs available. Varieties of syllabi have been tried out on an equally large variety of ac. In spite of all safe guards apparently introduced in devising these training syllabi, accidents continue to occur. IAF therefore needs to address some of these issues by ensuring that pilots stepping into modern jets have the benefit of a defined syllabus and best practices. This is a challenge where syllabus needs continuous revision while maintaining adequate time for assimilation and study. Following actions are warranted: -
(a) Changes of minor nature need to be incorporated annually within the training command.
(b) Major changes in syllabi need deliberate study and require to be done on a three /five-yearly basis at the Air HQ level, utilising the best from field and HQ staff.
30. Transition Training. In the ideal situation, pilots would get all the training they needed to prepare for stepping up to their next aircraft. Safely putting low-time pilots into high-performance aircraft has always been a challenge. There is presently no quick, inexpensive fix to building maturity and the yearning for professionalism. It takes time and more than a quick formal checkout, particularly if the pilot is relatively young and inexperienced. The following points need attention in this regard: -
(a) Realistic training is essential to prepare for a real emergency. Military trainers operate under the motto: "Train like you fight; fight like you train." Surprise in combat or in flight is a bad thing. Training needs to be made as realistic as possible without infringing on flight safety.
(b) Training at units must also emphasise on learning from others’ mistakes. It is less expensive and far less embarrassing to learn from ones own mistake. Studying accident reports is a sobering way to learn about flight Safety. The articles in Flight Safety Magazine and reports issued by the DFS from time to time is one such way. It allows us a look into problem areas, before an accident occurs and correct things either systemically or individually.
Environment
31. Environment constitutes all elements, which have a bearing on flying operations. By virtue of this fact, they are likely to be taken lightly in normal scheme of things. However many of the accidents have their genesis in the environment and thus the environment should be made conducive to safe operations. A safe environment needs the professionalism of every single individual. No task, however small, can be missed in the chain. The ground, technical and administrative support must synergies towards creating such an environment. The overall environment can broadly be divided into organisational environment & operating environment.
32. Organisational Environment. This refers to the set of values and work ethos prevailing in the organisation. To foster environment conducive to safety, an appropriate culture needs to be developed and nurtured. This refers to a culture where error reporting is encouraged and there is an acceptance that human error is inevitable. Mechanisms such as non-punitive reporting, recurrent training, periodic evaluation of safety management programmes and easy access to flight safety data need to be in place and actively functioning. The aspects pertinent in the area of organisational environment are as follows: -
(a) Inspection & Assessment. Inspections carried out by the organisation should not only measure compliance to prescribed standards but also identify potential hazards and make constructive suggestions for improving the safety environment. Only when all the presonnel are encouraged to continuously assess their environment and share relevant information, a ‘learning organisational climate’ can be created based on shared understanding. This would then enable development of a compatible organisational environment encompassing the equipment, mission procedures and personnel such that they are able to identify errors/hazards early and facilitate safe operations. Following measures need to be implemented in the right spirit:-
(i) Flight safety audits need to be formalised and carried out and form a part of performance appraisal system of all key personnel in the field.
(ii) Inspections/audits need to be carried out by SFS&IO regularly and reported to the respective Command.
(iii) Inspections by Commands may then be scheduled with a report being rendered to Air HQ for suitable monitoring & follow-up.
(b) Sensitivity to Operations. An organisation should have an ongoing concern with the unexpected, attentiveness to these and acknowledgement that the cause of an accident is often not the result of a single, active error. Rather, many latent errors get embedded in the operational system until a combination of adverse events occurs leading to a catastrophic accident. Hence, the organisation needs to focus on everyone knowing the ‘big picture’. This calls for a willingness to do true introspection and change in the ethos and pattern for aircraft accident investigation. The following merit consideration: -
(i) Investigations need to be conducted by a professional team of members who are formally trained in this specialised field.
(ii) One or more members from an independent aviation organisation / agency may be co-opted into Courts of Inquiry to assure a degree of independence.
33. Operating Environment. This involves the following: -
(a) Ground Infrastructure & Support Services. The recent analysis of accidents reveal that the ground infrastructure in terms of surveillance and precision radars, Nav aids, Communications and other supporting systems need to be revamped. Launch and recovery of ac vis-à-vis prevailing and forecasted weather need deliberate assessment. The ground support services would need to gear up within the existing limitations and function with greater involvement. The elements of air traffic services should be well trained, adequate motivated staff, clean, hygienic and ergonomically designed control towers, proactive met services, well-maintained safety services and continuity training in various exigencies.
(b) Navigational and Recovery Aids. The navigational and recovery aids should have high reliability of desirable performance, low downtimes, planned effective maintenance and well-trained ground controllers. The controllers should interact with the aircrew on a daily basis to enhance their perspective and better understand the capability of each aircrew. There should be optimal utilisation of all air defence radars and aids in effective monitoring of flights and their recovery.
(c) Runways and Operating Surfaces. Runway and operating surfaces remains a perennial source of FOD that affect a large number of flights. Besides, the runway conditions affect the wear and tear of tyres and have a bearing on aircraft operations due to undesirable water logging. A well-maintained runway along with night lighting system will go a long way in contributing to flight safety. Future plans must cater for making the AF flight safety zones and ac manoeuvring areas, vehicle-free. Runway crossings must be banned. All antennae, lighting etc have to be frangible, to collapse on impact. Hangars and maintenance areas need to be spotless wherein indoctrination and active support of all personnel are required.
(d) Wild Life and Bird Control Measures. Wild life menace and bird activity poses a great hazard to flight operations. Wild life and environment organisations need to be co-opted at all levels. Bird hazard combat measures need to be well integrated with the flying operations and suitably monitored. This is an ongoing activity and requires collation and study to be instituted at the station level for suitable proactive measures to be implemented for combating the bird hazard.
(e) Command and Control. Effective operational control system is essential for flow of relevant information and its understanding by the operators. The system should be free of delays, red tape and responsive to the need of the field units. The chain of command should be clear with well-demarcated responsibilities.
(f) Information Dissemination. An online information dissemination infrastructure requires making available all the relevant information to the user in the field, in a usable and friendly manner. An open forum must be provided to facilitate feedback and constructive suggestions from the field units / personnel.
CONTACT US
Address: Air Cmde TP Singh VSM
Directorate of Aviation Safety
West Block - VI, Wing III
Air Headquarters (R K Puram)
New Delhi - 110 066
Phone: (+91)11-26172738
FAX : (+91)11-26187154
E-mail: pdflightsafety@yahoo.com | 
